Government and defence

Government and defence estates combine several attack types on a single site: forced entry to secure rooms, ballistic attack on facades and entrances, and blast from vehicle bombs or satchel charges. Specifiers need products tested to the matching standard for each threat. This page maps the main zones to the right rating.

• LPS 1175 C5 to D10Forced entry ratings for sensitive rooms
• EN 1522 FB4 to FB7Ballistic classes for doors, windows and facades
• ISO 16933 EXVBlast glazing rated against vehicle bombs
• PAS 68 and IWA 14-1Vehicle impact ratings for the perimeter

The threats government and defence sites face

Forced entry threatens the rooms that hold sensitive material: comms rooms, evidence stores, armouries and plant areas. Attackers bring hand tools at minimum, and power tools where they expect time to work. The doors, frames and locks must hold for the minutes stated in the rating, because delay is what defeats this kind of attack.

Ballistic attack targets facades, entrance glazing and reception screens. The threat ranges from handguns to rifles, and the specification must name the weapon class the product is tested against. Bullet resistant glass rated to EN 1063 and bullet resistant doors tested to EN 1522 give a matched envelope, rather than a single strong pane sitting in a weak frame.

Blast comes from vehicle bombs at the perimeter and from hand-carried satchel charges closer in. Glazing is the main hazard, because blast turns ordinary glass into high velocity fragments. Blast resistant glass tested to ISO 16933 keeps the fragments in the frame, and every result carries a hazard rating from A (no break) to F (high hazard).

Vehicle-borne attack aims to breach the boundary or to deliver a bomb close to the building. Hostile vehicle mitigation at the perimeter holds the stand-off distance that the blast design assumes. Without that distance, the blast ratings on the building mean far less.

Standards and guidance for government and defence

LPS 1175 rates forced entry resistance by tool category and attack time, from A1 (old SR1) to H20 (old SR8). Government specifications commonly call for C5 or D10 on sensitive rooms. C5 is the five minute class against tools such as crowbars, drills and chisels, while D10 is the ten minute class against sledgehammers, disc cutters and jigsaws. The LPS 1175 guide covers every class, and security doors are available across the range.

EN 1522 classifies ballistic resistance for doors, windows and shutters from FB1 (.22 LR) up to FB7 (7.62 x 51 hard core, armour piercing). FB4 covers .357 and .44 Magnum, FB5 covers 5.56 x 45 rifle, and FB6 covers 5.56 x 45 and 7.62 x 51 rifle rounds. The suffix NS means no splinters on the safe side, while S means splinters are permitted. EN 1063 rates the glass itself from BR1 to BR7, plus SG1 and SG2 for shotgun. The ballistic ratings guide explains both standards.

ISO 16933 rates blast glazing. EXV classes cover vehicle bombs of 100 kg TNT equivalent at a stand-off distance, from EXV45 down to EXV10. The number is the distance in metres, so EXV10 is the most severe. SB classes cover hand-carried satchel charges. Every result also carries a hazard rating from A (no break) to F (high hazard). The blast ratings guide sets out the full scale.

Vehicle impact is rated to PAS 68, IWA 14-1 or ISO 22343-1:2023, the current international standard that supersedes both. A rating states the vehicle type and mass, impact speed, impact angle and penetration distance. Test vehicles include the 1,500 kg car, 2,500 kg 4×4, 3,500 kg van, 7,200 or 7,500 kg truck and 30,000 kg truck, at speeds of 48, 64 and 80 km/h. See the vehicle impact ratings guide.

Test the assembly, not the component. A BR7 pane in an untested frame gives no reliable rating. Ask for test evidence on the complete doorset or window, frame and fixings included.

Zone by zone: government and defence

Each zone on a government or defence site faces a different attack, so each needs its own rating. Use the table as a starting point and confirm the final classes with the project threat assessment.

Government and defence specification mistakes to avoid

• Treating a ballistic rating as a blast rating. FB classes stop projectiles; they say nothing about blast pressure.
• Specifying the glass without the frame. Both ballistic and blast performance depend on the tested assembly.
• Forgetting the NS suffix. On the occupied side, no-splinter performance matters as much as stopping the round.
• Setting HVM at the boundary weaker than the building needs. The blast design assumes a stand-off distance, and the perimeter must hold it.
• Using one rating across the whole site. Entrances, facades and secure rooms face different attacks.
• Accepting a datasheet instead of test evidence. Ask for the test report and the standard it was tested to.